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Abstract 
By considering the political effects of the First World War in the whole of the West 
Midlands (rather than just Birmingham or the Black Country), this article seeks to 
demonstrate that, although the political culture of the region shifted in terms of 
behaviours and priorities, many of the features of the late Victorian and Edwardian 
regional polity survived the ‘deluge’ of war. The region became less politically 
homogenous, however, as the pressures of the war and the political responses to 
these exposed significant differences between the rural counties, the Black Country 
and the Birmingham conurbation. It concludes that the future political direction of 
Britain was by no means decided by 1918 and that the electoral results of the first 
fully democratic election demonstrated that there were many possible alternative 
choices for a population keen to cement the perceived unity of Britain which was 
credited for winning the longest and bloodiest struggle since the British Civil Wars. 
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The West Midlands, despite lacking a coastal port, can act as a microcosm for the 
whole of Britain in assessing the impact of the First World War on political 
alignments, behaviours and culture. Using roughly the same regional boundaries laid 
down by C.B. Fawcett and effectively employed by Henry Pelling in his Social 
Geography of British Elections, the West Midlands serves as a case study for the 
whole variety of British political complexity of the early twentieth century. It varied 
from the highly rural counties of Worcestershire, Herefordshire and Shropshire, to 
the mixed counties of Warwickshire and Staffordshire. The urban spaces range from 
traditional county towns such as Shrewsbury and Worcester, smaller towns such as 
Leamington and Stafford, dispersed areas of industry such as the Black County and 
large centres of varied trade such as Birmingham and Coventry. Before the First 
World War, almost all varieties of political identity could be found, despite the area’s 
reputation as Joseph Chamberlain’s ‘fiefdom’1. There were ‘backwoods’ Tories in 
Worcester and Evesham, more conciliatory Conservatives such as Stanley Baldwin 
in Bewdley, traditional Liberals such as John Wilson in North Worcestershire, 
radicals such as David Mason in Coventry and the Lib-Labber, William Johnson, in 
Nuneaton. The distinctive feature of the region, however, was the persistent strength 
of the Liberal Unionist party. While the rest of the party had collapsed as a result of 
the tariff reform split and the 1906 electoral debacle, the Liberal Unionists still held 
the majority of Birmingham seats in 1914.  This one exception to the broader political 
map in 1914 can be attributed to the personal appeal of Joseph Chamberlain and his 
circle of loyal Radical Unionists who fused patriotic support for crown, Empire and 
Union with genuine enthusiasm for substantial social reform.2  Birmingham’s 
distinctiveness had, however, gradually faded after Joseph’s debilitating stroke in 
1906, as Austen Chamberlain had grown far closer to Balfour and Bonar Law than 
his father. Seats once held by Liberal Unionists in Birmingham and the surrounding 
area had been meekly handed over to Conservatives to contest and finally the 
national Liberal Unionist Association had merged with the Central Conservative 
Associaton in May 1912 in response to the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill.3 
Although the issue had been discussed in 1914, the Birmingham Liberal Unionist 
Association had held out against ‘fusion’ for almost the whole duration of the war, 
largely as a result of Austen’s vacillations on the issue. Neville Chamberlain, 
                                                          
1
 M.C. Hurst, Joseph Chamberlain and West Midland Politics, 1886-1895 (Oxford, 1962). 
2
 I. Cawood, The Liberal Unionist Party, 1886-1912 (London, 2012); I. Cawood and C. Upton (eds.), Joseph 
Chamberlain: Imperial Statesman, National Leader and Local Icon (London, 2016). 
3
 Cawood, The Liberal Unionist Party, 240-41. 
determined to re-assert his control of the city’s political structure after his failure at 
the National Service Department, faced down a challenge from Arthur Steel-
Maitland, MP for Erdington and former Conservative Party chairman and took control 
of the now-united organisation in early 1918.4 He took this step because he was 
aware of several challenges which needed to be faced in order to maintain Unionist 
control of the city. Firstly, the 1918 Representation of the People Act (RPA) had 
increased Birmingham’s electorate from 95,000 to 427,000 and the number of 
constituencies had increased from seven to twelve. This expanded and redistributed 
electorate was organised into seats far more class-homogenous than had been the 
case until December 1910. Secondly, the new electorate included women over the 
age of thirty for the first time, and Chamberlain needed a centralised organisation to 
reach out to these new groups.5 His wisdom in cutting the Gordian knot of Unionist 
identity in the city is shown by the fact that, although the election was called 
unexpectedly on 14 November 1918, the Birmingham Unionist Association was able 
to produce swiftly a series of effective campaigning leaflets (including one titled A 
word to the Ladies!6) which meant he never had to release his own copy of the 
‘coupon’ in order to win his seat.7 
In addition to the influence of Joseph Chamberlain’s socially progressive brand of 
Unionism, there was also a strong regional tradition of the working class 
conservatism which was rooted in distrust of middle-call ‘faddist’ Liberal interference 
in traditional masculine behaviour, most particularly drinking. Jon Lawrence has 
identified that in Wolverhampton resistance to liquor control was a potent recruiter to 
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Conservative causes in the pre-war years.8 The drinking culture of the Midlands’ 
working classes remained problematic throughout the war. The Times reported in 
April 1915 that ‘unrest among operatives engaged in various branches of trade in the 
Birmingham...is to do [in part] with the drink question’ and that in Redditch drinking 
was interfering with production at the Royal Enfield motorcycle factory.9  In 1917, a 
Commission of Enquiry was ‘frankly amazed at the strength of objection in the region 
to the liquor restrictions’ that had been introduced in October 1915 and the War 
Cabinet spent time discussing the region’s worrying propensity for alcohol.10 The 
Coalition Liberal candidate in Lichfield, Sir Courtenay Warner, when questioned on 
his attitude towards licensing during the 1918 election, cleverly avoided being 
associated with the moralising traditions of his party, conscious as he was that he 
was competing with a Labour candidate for the working class vote, when he rejected 
the idea of prohibition and only gave lukewarm support for the idea of a national 
scheme for the control of the liquor trade.11 
In order to test the impact of the First World War on the politics of the West 
Midlands, this article will explore the degree of continuity found in the political 
discourse during the war in the region, the behaviour and attitudes of the politicians, 
activists, journalists, interest groups and the voting public and the relative 
performance of the three main parties (despite the complexities of the Lloyd George 
Coalition) in the General Election of 1918. The election was called within days of the 
declaration of the armistice and which was the first modern election in which voting 
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took place on a single day (14 December), although the complexities of organising 
the voters of servicemen meant that the result was not declared until 28 December. 
The electoral campaign was opened by Prime Minister Lloyd George on a visit to 
Wolverhampton Town Hall on 23 November 1918 at which he acknowledged ‘how 
much we had to depend upon the Midlands’ in the war and where he also first 
promised ‘to make Britain a fit country for heroes to live in’12 Lloyd George led a 
coalition government dominated by the Unionists, with only the support of a third of 
the Liberal Party since the fall of Herbert Asquith in December 1916. The majority of 
the Labour party had left the coalition at the end of the war, in order to exploit the 
splits within the Liberal party, while seeking to heal the divisions between ‘patriots’ 
and pacifists in its own ranks. To capitalise on his popularity as the ‘man who won 
the war’ and to clearly identify the supporters of his government in a period of 
complex loyalties and party labels,13 Lloyd George and the Conservative leader, 
Andrew Bonar Law, issued coalition endorsements to individual candidates which 
Asquith mocked as ‘coupons’ and the liberal Birmingham Gazette called ‘tickets.’14 
Given the impact of the First World War on British society and culture and the 
dramatic increase in the electorate following the 1918 RPA, the focus on this election 
is justified because, as John Turner has decisively proved, ‘the Coupon election was 
unique…an important member of a series of elections which steadily transformed 
British electoral geography.’15  
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One of Neville Chamberlain’s dearest hopes was that the war would see the collapse 
of old party labels.16 Chamberlain’s dream was shared by others, both within and 
outside the traditional party limits and across the whole political spectrum and, 
although it did not come to pass, the fluid politics of the West Midlands which had 
been produced by the debates over Home Rule and Tariff Reform continued for 
many years after the war. When it eventually settled into traditional two party politics 
in the later 1920s, it appeared to do so in a different fashion and according to 
different agendas than in 1914. This article will argue that the degree of change was 
relatively superficial, however, and that West Midlands political culture proved 
remarkably resilient to the challenge of the First World War. 
 
For the majority of the war the West Midlands, like most of Britain, saw little formal 
party politics in the sense of political meetings and election campaigns. The chief 
political issue, the level of support for the war, galvanised the meetings that took 
place in and around Birmingham in late July and early August 1914. These were 
initially opposed to intervention in the conflict, until Belgian neutrality was violated 
and the Liberal cabinet and the nation, including the Labour Trades Councils, rallied 
to the protection of France and Belgium.17  John Bourne has recently commented 
that, following this initial volte-face, ‘there can be no doubt that Kitchener’s “call to 
arms” met with a ready response in the midlands.’18 Pacifist groups such as No 
Conscription Fellowship and the Union of Democratic Control did have some 
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support, particularly in urban areas where there was a strong Quaker presence. The 
artist Joseph Southall chaired the Birmingham branch of the Independent Labour 
Party, which officially opposed conscription and in July 1916 they joined with the No 
Conscription Fellowship to organise a rally of 1,200 people in Bournville.19 Fervid 
patriotism, although challenged by these groups, was encouraged by the bulk of the 
print media and led to the emergence of new parties such as the National Party, the 
British Workers’ League (which put forward candidates for the 1918 election under 
the name of the National Democratic and Labour Party) and the Women’s Party, 
founded by Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst.  All of these parties claimed that 
they shared Neville Chamberlain’s vision for a true patriotic alliance which placed the 
interests of the whole community before narrow, sectional interests, yet all three 
failed to make a significant impact on the politics of the region.   
The National Party was co-founded in August 1917 by Richard Cooper, MP for 
Walsall, and was, according to Martin Pugh, anti-German and opposed to ‘the alien 
problem’ (in other words, he was anti-Semitic).20 He drew, therefore, on a tradition of 
radical right wing politics in Edwardian Britain, previously delineated by Ewan 
Green.21 The National Party campaigned against corruption in public service through 
its journal, National Opinion, a key issue at a time of rising anger against political 
jobbery and ‘profiteering’. Rowland Hunt, MP for Ludlow since 1903, briefly joined 
the Party, but he retired before the General Election of 1918. 22 Cooper had won the 
Walsall seat in 1910 and although the National Party which he and Page Croft 
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created was not officially endorsed (not surprisingly, given the Party’s antipathy 
towards Lloyd George), no Conservative candidate was put forward for the 1918 
election in Walsall. Neither the Liberal nor the Labour candidates received the 
coupon and, with the backing of National Democratic and Labour Party leaders such 
as Havelock Wilson, Cooper won the seat with a comfortable majority of 6,156.23  As 
will be seen, this went against the wider regional political trends of the Black Country 
and can be interpreted as evidence of loyalty towards those sitting members who 
demonstrated unquestioning enthusiasm for the war. It is also possible to see the 
National Party’s undiluted enthusiasm for Tariff Reform as contributing to the victory 
in a region which had struggled with European imports before the war and feared the 
consequences of a lenient peace with Germany. 
The National Democratic and Labour Party (NDLP) was a somewhat more complex 
organisation. It had the support in the West Midlands of genuinely popular Labour 
figures, such as W.J. Davis, General Secretary of the National Brassworkers and 
Metal Mechanics Union, John Beard, co-founder of the Workers’ Union and Eldred 
Hallas, leader of Birmingham Municipal Employees Union.24 This was because the 
Birmingham Trades Council had split in 1915 between an anti-conscription and a 
patriotic Labour group.25 Davis and Hallas had then helped to found the British 
Workers’ League (BWL) in March 1916 as an alternative to a national Labour Party 
split by the attitude of pacifists such as Ramsay MacDonald and Philip Snowden.26 
The NDLP was founded in spring 1918 by the BWL to fight the election, and it 
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secured immunity from Conservative competition from Bonar Law himself.27 For 
Neville Chamberlain, however, this hindered the ‘usefulness’ of the BWL, as it made 
them appear an external opponent of the official Labour party, rather than an 
alternative faction within it.28 The NDLP clearly regarded the West Midlands as a 
fertile recruiting ground, however, as they adopted a new position as a patriotic, pro-
Coalition labour party.29 Of their twenty eight candidates in 1918, four stood for 
election in seats across the region.30  
 
 Neville Chamberlain and Arthur Steel-Maitland persuaded the Duddeston Unionist 
Association to endorse Eldred Hallas’s candidature, though Chamberlain was 
privately worried by the strident vitriol of other NDLP speeches and articles in the 
British Citizen and Empire Worker.31 Victor Fisher, a protégé of Milner’s and another 
co-founder of the BWL, was allocated the newly created seat of Stourbridge and duly 
issued with the ‘coupon’.  This high-handed treatment of the constituency was 
reminiscent of the pre-war actions of Joseph Chamberlain in the region and 
provoked a similarly negative reaction, with Fisher’s meetings very poorly attended.32 
The sitting Liberal MP, John Wilson, had held the seat since 1895 and had carried 
his constituents’ loyalty when he had left the Liberal Unionists and re-joined the 
Liberals over Tariff Reform in 1903.33 Wilson held the seat by 1,333 votes, the 
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largest majority of his career.34 The NDLP was also clearly short of money, as 
demonstrated by the abortive campaign of Willie Dyson, who was forced to use a 
horse to travel to his ill-attended meetings around Nuneaton, as he could not afford 
the exorbitant petrol prices from his election funds.35  The party’s brief moment in 
1918, pointed towards the significance of cross-class politics during the war which 
will be explored further below; as Hallas put it during his campaign: ‘down with 
pacifism, down with party politics, up with the Coalition.’36 Nigel Keohane observes 
that the NDLP should be seen as a continuation of the ‘Joseph 
Chamberlainite…endeavour to win the working classes over…through positive 
polices of national applicability.’37 However, once the passions of the war had died 
down, the appeal of the NDLP swiftly faded. Hallas crossed the floor in 1919 and 
joined the Labour Party and Seddon lost his seat in the 1922 election.  
The Pankhursts’ Women’s Party briefly enjoyed the support of the Northcliffe press, 
in particular the Daily Mail.38 In October 1918, the Mail printed a prominent article 
entitled ‘Join the Women’s Party’ highlighting the fear of socialism provoked by the 
series of strikes in 1917-18, including those in the hitherto quiescent West 
Midlands.39 For reasons still not entirely clear, almost at the last minute, Christabel 
Pankhurst was allowed to contest Smethwick and Lloyd George and Bonar Law 
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forced the withdrawal of the Unionist candidate, Major Thompson, on 4 December.40 
As in Stourbridge, the parachuting in of a candidate to suit the priorities of the party 
leaders had unfortunate consequences.41  When Thompson presided at one of 
Pankhurst’s meetings, hecklers called for him to stand anyway. Thompson 
responded, somewhat unhelpfully’ that ‘for what reason that mandate was sent down 
he did not know… but he felt that it was sent down for the good of the country and 
possibly for the good of the women’s cause.’ In a largely middle class seat, 
Christabel’s rhetoric may have been better received, but she had clearly little idea of 
the attitude of the Smethwick electorate when she then stated that ‘the Labour 
Party...was, in fact, a Bolshevist party because it was led by Bolshevists.’ 42 Such 
‘blistering anti-trade union rhetoric’ Nicola Gullace concludes, ‘may thus have 
alienated the wives of workers whose material well-being seemed to rest on 
collective bargaining and their husbands' wages.’43 Her Labour opponent, J.E. 
Davison, was actually a well-respected union official who had led recruitment drives 
and played his part on government committees and he was easily able to prick the 
bubble of Pankhurst’s rhetoric.44 She lost the seat by 775 votes, with her sister, 
Sylvia, commenting sardonically in the Workers’ Dreadnought that ‘perhaps only the 
Irish electorate was quite ready to elect a woman.’45 Christabel defiantly announced 
that the result ‘shows it will not be long before I am in the House’46  but the Women’s 
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Party folded when it ran out of funds  and Christabel left Britain in 1921, with her 
mother joining the Tories.47  
There was a final organisation which may have only contested two West Midlands 
seat by itself, but which played a significant role in the 1918 election, the National 
Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Soldiers and Sailors (NFDDSS), one of a 
number of ex-servicemen’s organisations which were eventually combined into the 
apolitical Royal British Legion. The NFDDSS was formed in 1917 in opposition to the 
government’s recall of wounded ex-servicemen and it developed a left-wing 
programme of increased pay for soldiers and nationalisation of the land and means 
of production (a year before the Labour party). It also refused to allow officers to join 
unless they had risen from the ranks. It was, however, fiercely patriotic, as anti-
German as the National Party with red, white and blue election colours and 
decidedly anti-Socialist.48 The NFDDSS put up a candidate in Aston, J. H. Dooley, in 
opposition to Sir Evelyn Cecil, a nephew of the late Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury. 
Although described by the Unionist Birmingham Daily Post as ‘a redundancy’, 
Dooley’s candidature did reveal the anti-party sentiment that motivated the three 
larger alternative parties in the area. At a meeting on behalf of Dooley, an 
anonymous speaker expressed the view that ‘by accepting the Coalition ‘ticket’ 
[Cecil] had become a penny-in-the-slot machine, an automaton.’49 In Moseley, 
although they did not stand, the NFDDSS intervened to support the candidature of 
the Liberal, Wilfred Hill, as ‘he pledged his word that he would not be a party 
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politician and would not allow his vote to be influenced by the fortunes of his party.’50 
In Coventry, Arthur Bannington, a follower of Henry Hyndman, stood as a ‘Silver 
Badge’ candidate in collaboration with the rival National Association of Discharged 
Sailors and Soldiers (NADSS).51 Bannington had risen to the rank of sergeant during 
the war and had been sent home suffering from shell shock in 1916 where he had 
established a branch of the NFDDSS in Coventry in 1917. He had intervened in the 
November and December engineering strikes in the city and attempted to persuade 
the strikers to return to work and he stood under the banner of ‘no party tag’.52 The 
nuanced position of the NFDDSS seemed to have little effect, however, apart from 
splitting the small Liberal vote, with Dooley and Bannington both getting less than 
10% of the votes in Aston and Coventry and Wilfrid Hill coming last in Moseley 
behind the Labour candidate.   
Rather than strictly political issues such as Home Rule and Tariff Reform, the war in 
the West Midlands was unsurprisingly dominated by the question of living and 
working conditions. Although campaigns to raise the salaries of servicemen and to 
improve the pensions of those discharged and the dependents of the dead were 
sporadically noted, largely through the influence of the NFDDSS, it was the 
campaign for the improved wages and conditions of workers in reserved occupations 
that did most to upset the social harmony that was a distinctive feature of pre-war 
West Midlands political identity. Adrian Gregory has noted the ‘in the Midlands, food 
prices were ‘the chief cause of unrest.’53  By January 1916 the Wolverhampton 
Trades Council was complaining that prices had risen 45% cent since the beginning 
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of the war and wages, allowances to dependents of servicemen, and relief paid by 
the Board of Guardians had not risen to the same extent.  In the campaign for the 
Aston seat in 1918, one speaker commented bitterly that  
It had been suggested that on the memorial to the brave men who had fallen 
should be the words ‘their names liveth for evermore’ but the mothers of those 
brave men were expected to live on sixpence a day.54 
When rationing was finally introduced in the town in January 1918, the Trades 
Council complained that the scheme had been introduced too late due to the power 
of the shopkeepers on the City Council.  The food situation continued to deteriorate 
and became, in the words of Emma Sproson at a local ILP Conference in February 
1918 called to discuss the issue, 'second only to the war itself.' The late and limited 
development of a system of rationing, to combat profiteering by producers and 
shopkeepers and to ensure that the poor could still access all foods, was a source of 
resentment across the region. 55 By failing to guarantee affordable food, the state 
was widely seen to be favouring the wealthy,  and this attitude was entrenched by 
the fuel shortages in the harsh winter of 1917-18.56 As the 1917 Commission on 
Industrial Unrest concluded, the failure to restrict prices would lead the public to 
‘continue to blame the Government for not dealing with profiteers so long as high 
prices continue.’57  
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In the whole of the West Midlands, the main weapon that the workers could wield to 
challenge their deteriorating standard of living was that of the strike. Strikes had, of 
course, taken place before the war, most notably the 1913 Black Country strike 
which had also affected Birmingham as some of the plants on strike were part of the 
Large Metropolitan Company and had factories at Saltley and Smethwick.58 The 
trade union movement, previously of relatively little influence in Birmingham a city 
largely comprised of small workshops and paternalistic owners such as the Kenricks, 
the Cadburys and the Nettlefolds, had been boosted by the growth of munitions 
factories such as B.S.A., Kynoch’s and the National Shell Factory at Washwood 
Heath and the diversification of existing production in ‘controlled establishments’ 
such as armoured car and aircraft manufacture at the Longbridge Austin 
works.59  The right to strike in war industries was removed by the 1915 Treasury 
Agreement and compulsory arbitration substituted.  By 1917, however, anger with 
the continued rise in prices and the gradual erosion of the protection of skilled trades 
from military service led to the development of shop stewards committees.  In the 
West Midlands these were initially most powerful in Birmingham and Coventry and 
then spread into Wolverhampton and the Black Country.  In December 1917, 
150,000 engineering workers in the West Midlands threatened to strike if the shop 
stewards were not recognised by the employers, and this matter was quickly 
resolved.  But strikes became more frequent as the war proceeded, with a dispute 
over exemptions from service that led to 10-12,000 Birmingham aeroplane workers 
briefly striking in January 1918, a stoppage of munitions workers across the region in 
July 1918 and, in September 1918, a national rail strike which extended into 
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Worcestershire, Herefordshire and Shropshire.60 From the available evidence, the 
impact of the war on trade union membership in the West Midlands was dramatic.  
The number of trade unionists in Wolverhampton, for example, rose from 5,000 in 
1914 to 20,000 by 1918.61  This consequently gave the newly established Labour 
party much greater ability to put forward candidates in the December 1918 election 
than the divided and demoralised ‘Squiffites’, but as, John Turner observed, it was 
‘less certain that these members all represented potential Labour votes’ as many 
workers joined trade unions for distinctly non-progressive motives. 62 
From the results of the 1918 election, however, it seems that there was little 
widespread anger towards the owners of the factories in Birmingham and Coventry. 
A sense of social responsibility had clearly endured among certain industrialists, 
despite the challenge and opportunities presented by the war. Herbert Austin had 
deliberately kept his prices low, in order to challenge what he regarded as an unfair 
cartel in the arms trade and he frequently failed to make any profit on government 
contracts, as an example to others.63 Similarly, Stanley Baldwin decided to get ‘rid of 
my war profits’ and proceeded to donate a fifth of his wealth, approximately 
£120,000, as a contribution towards alleviating the War Debt.64 Hallewell Rogers, 
chairman of B.S.A., was far more professional than Herbert Austin, managing to 
achieve net profits of over £400,000 for nearly every year of the war and to pay a 
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dividend of 20% to the shareholders from 1914 to 1918.65 Rogers was a supporter of 
the National Alliance of Employers and Employed (NAEE), however, a body 
designed to prevent industrial conflict and he spoke of his support for a new model of 
co-operation between capital and labour during the 1918 election campaign.66 In 
December 1918, his company also produced a leaflet on the company’s history 
stressing the ‘welfare work among B.S.A. employees’ such as the provision of a 
surgery, a gymnasium and education classes.67 Sir Edward Manville, the B.S.A.’s 
vice chairman and the chairman of the B.S.A’s subsidiary, the Coventry-based 
Daimler company, was on the executive committee of the NAEE and was a close 
associate of Dudley Docker, Birmingham’s ‘industrial titan’ who was  now at the 
centre of national business and politics.68 Manville’s campaign literature during the 
1918 Coventry election pledged his support for ‘the adoption of a minimum wage for 
all workers’, ‘equal pay for equal work done by women’ and  ‘comradeship between 
employed and employer’ (see fig. 1). Austin, Rogers and Manville were all 
comfortably elected in December 1918. Perhaps the relative failure of the Coalition in 
Staffordshire can be explained by the failure of the business class in the Black 
Country to effectively reach out to both the established and the newly industrialised 
workers of the region. With the exception of Richard Cooper in Walsall and Alfred 
Bird in Wolverhampton West, the Coalition’s candidates were less prominent figures 
than those such as the Chamberlains, Austin, Rogers, Hallas and Manville. Arthur 
Beck, the Birmingham electrics magnate, lost heavily in Kingswinford as the support 
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of Dudley Docker had much less cachet in the Black Country than in Birmingham 
and he could not match the oratory or the impeccably patriotic and trade union 
credentials of his opponent, Charles Sitch.69 
 
Fig. 1. Election leaflet of Edward Manville.70 
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Some radical Labour and Liberal members delighted in the freedom from 
conventional politics that the splits in their parties provided them. No longer at the 
margins of the political debate, pacifists and radicals in both parties sought to drive 
their agendas home, despite the opposition from within and the antipathy without. 
The words of those such as John Kneeshaw in Ladywood, Robert Outhwaite in 
Hanley and David Mason in Coventry produced a heated response from both middle 
and lower class electors in the region. Kneeshaw, who took on the hopeless task of 
challenging the new political ‘duke’ of Birmingham, Neville Chamberlain, had led the 
pacifist takeover of the Birmingham TUC in 1915, which had driven Hallas, Davis 
and many other patriotic working men into the arms of the Chamberlains.  Given 
such an outspoken opponent, Chamberlain seemed to speak of Kneeshaw more in 
mockery than in anger, commenting that, in the unlikely event of Neville’s defeat, 
Kneeshaw’s ‘influence [at Westminster] would be no greater than it was in the City 
Council, where, indeed, he had absolutely none at all.’71 He left the smears to others. 
The Birmingham Daily Post thundered to its readership that ‘Kneeshaw stands out 
egregiously as the leader in the constituency of that band of political intransigents 
with Bolshevist leanings.’72 His constituency association produced an effective 
leaflet, What Labour thinks of Kneeshaw, which quoted the councillor’s speech of 20 
September 1918 in which he had stated ‘the purposes of the allied governments in 
this war are precisely the same as the purposes of the Germanic powers’ and 
reprinted the condemnations of this ‘treacherous speech’ from Sidney Webb, W.J. 
Davis and J.H. Thomas.73 Chamberlain‘s majority was decisive, nearly 7,000, even 
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though only 40% of the electorate bothered to vote.74 Mason of Coventry proved 
similarly determined but hapless.  His electoral leaflet showed him in the formal 
dress of an Edwardian politician and the contents were similarly dated, with electoral 
slogans such as ‘I am and always have been a staunch supporter of Free Trade’, 
‘religious freedom’, ‘self-government for Ireland’ and ‘land reform’ demonstrating how 
little he, like so many Liberals in the region, had failed to adapt to the changing 
agenda caused by the war and the coming of near full democracy.75 As a local paper 
noted, ‘Mr D.M. Mason’s position at the bottom of the poll has, perhaps, surprised no 
one but himself.’76 Although individual conscientious objectors in the West Midlands, 
especially those who ‘took a religious stand’ such as the Quakers, were treated with 
grudging respect from the public77, no candidate who expressed sympathy for 
pacifism was elected in the West Midlands. Millman concludes, ‘working class 
patriotism for most of the war and in most of Britain was the majority reaction.’78    
Patriotism, a factor which is often asserted as of crucial significance in such elections 
as 1886 and 190079 and which is described by Jonathan Parry as ‘at its most 
effective as a cry when domestic [and] …foreign themes could be worked together’80, 
was promoted ceaselessly throughout the war by the press, voluntary groups such 
as Central Committee of National Patriotic Organisations and the Ministries of 
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National Service and Information.81 It certainly became more precisely defined and 
allied with a strongly xenophobic nationalism during the 1918 election campaign. The 
common factor among all the Unionist candidates, both former Liberal Unionists and 
Conservatives, was the strident anti-German rhetoric which they used in their 
election literature, their formal election addresses and their public speeches. Calls 
for all Germans to be deported, for German goods to be boycotted and for the 
blockade against Germany to be maintained were not unusual.82 More common, of 
course, was the demand that Germany should be handed a bill of reparation at the 
Paris peace talks, that the Kaiser (and the leading German generals) should face 
justice and that there should be immediate confiscation of all German overseas 
possessions. This demand was used effectively to drum up support for the Coalition, 
for example in  Nuneaton, where the Coalition candidate, a Coventry solicitor named 
Henry Maddocks, ceaselessly attacked his three opponents for their failure to take a 
stronger line against the Germans.83 As John Turner has shown, this message 
played particularly well with the new enfranchised ‘wives and mothers of the dead 
and wounded.’84 Enjoying the full support of the local newspaper, the Nuneaton 
Chronicle, Maddocks was able to promote a patriotic message strong enough to 
defeat his divided opposition, despite his lack of a personal wartime record (see fig 
2).85 
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Fig. 2. Newspaper advert for Henry Maddocks’ candidature.86 
 
                                                          
86
 Nuneaton Chronicle, 29 November 1918 
Where a candidate did have a record of military service, this was ruthlessly exploited 
by both couponed and uncouponed candidates alike. John Baird, at Rugby was 
careful to be photographed for his sympathetic local paper in his uniform, with his 
military honours listed below.87  
As Matthew Johnson has pointed out, this was particularly effective in the case of 
sitting MPs with a military record.88 Across the West Midlands, eleven of the MPs 
who had seen active service retained their seats.89 With the ballot papers printing the 
occupation of the candidates, it is conceivable that instinctive patriotism may have 
decided the choice of floating voters in the voting booths on 14 December 1918 in 
cases such as that at Kidderminster where Eric Knight’s employment status as 
‘Major in His Majesty’s Army’ was in stark contrast to that of his Labour opponent 
which was given as ‘Trade Union Secretary.’90 
In the case of John Gretton in Burton, his status as chairman of the town’s largest 
employer, the brewers Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton Ltd, was so enhanced by his 
position as Colonel of the 6th Battalion of the North Staffordshire Regiment that he 
was unopposed in 1918.91 Although standing for the Liberal party in Coventry, Sir 
Courtenay Mansell was photographed for his election portrait in the uniform of an air 
force officer (see fig. 3) to distinguish him from that of the deselected Liberal pacifist 
MP, Mason. Mansell also made it clear that he supported the coalition government, 
even though it was Sir Edward Manville who was awarded the coupon and who 
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advertised himself as ‘the official coalition candidate.’ (see fig. 1). In Staffordshire, 
however, the tactic was less successful. In Leek, William Bromfield, the Labour 
candidate, secured a majority of 678 over his Coalition Liberal opponent, Rear 
Admiral Sir Guy Gaunt.92  In West Bromwich, Viscount Lewisham was defeated 
despite his positon as a lieutenant-colonel in the Staffordshire Yeomanry, though 
Lewisham’s defeat was partly due to his incapacity caused by contracting malaria 
while on service in Palestine.93 
 
Fig. 3. Election leaflet of Sir Courtney Mansel. 94 
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 For those candidates without a military record, evidence of service in aid of the war 
effort was usually sufficient for any officially endorsed Coalition candidate to win a 
seat, given the political cachet that already attached to them from their attachment 
with Lloyd George. Neville Chamberlain’s experiences as Director of National 
Service may have been a relative failure, but they were still cited in his campaign 
materials.95 And in Lichfield, the Coalition Liberal candidate, Sir Courtenay Warner, 
comfortably defeated his Labour rival with the local press stressing that he had given 
up his home in Suffolk to be used as a VAD hospital during the war.96 Failing that, a 
local industrialist’s financial contribution was a third means of demonstrating patriotic 
commitment. That of Hallewell Rogers in Moseley has already been noted, and he 
was matched by the custard magnate, Alfred Bird, at Wolverhampton West, who 
personally subscribed £100,000 to the War Loan campaign and £15,000 to the 
Wolverhampton ‘Feed the Guns’ campaign in the last month of the war.97  
 
This cross-party patriotism was also marked in the frequent calls for old party ties 
and old party practises to be left behind, once the war had rendered these 
redundant. Party may have been ‘the dominant organising theme of late Victorian 
politics’ but it had never been popular with the public or local politicians.98 Ernest 
Pollock, the unchallenged MP for Warwick and Leamington, expressed the wish ‘that 
the domestic problems of pre-war days shall be discarded in favour of the “solid 
affairs of the nation.”’ He went on to add that:  
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I should be…sorry if at an election we were once more to return to the old 
controversial and domestic issues which we left behind us in August 1914. I 
have myself no stomach for fighting battles on subjects many of which are out 
of date and may be put in the lumber-room of matters past.99 
As Laura Beers has somewhat cynically explained, in this way the Unionists were 
seeking ‘to craft a national political rhetoric which would help the party to hold onto 
power in the era of mass democracy.’100 This analysis fails to take a sufficiently 
nuanced view of the spectrum of ideology across the recently unified Unionist party, 
however. Promises of social reform, often very detailed ones, were common in most 
Coalition Unionist election addresses. Unionist, Liberal and Labour candidates all 
recognised that, by taking the ‘coupon’ they were signing up to Lloyd George’s 
reforming agenda, as well as sharing in the glory of the government’s military victory. 
If they, as in individual MPs, were forced to give up long-held beliefs, they gladly 
accepted this as a symbol of the on-going need for mutual sacrifice for the national 
good which the preceding four years had taught them. As Philip Williamson has 
convincingly described, the Conservative party increasingly absorbed Whig and 
Liberal tenets and values as it sought to readjust its position and appeal to a new 
electoral audience. Some of its leaders, such as Baldwin and Halifax, did so in order 
to try to act as a genuinely national body, able to put aside class, gender and 
religious differences and to behave in a fashion which brought peace and 
reconciliation to a country divided by the demands of war.101 The model of the new 
Britain posited by Baldwin and the whiggish Tories was largely a backwards-looking 
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rural vision of a lost Eden, which played well in Worcestershire, Herefordshire and 
Shropshire, while that of Neville Chamberlain and the Birmingham Unionists was far 
more urban and industrial, but equally meritocratic, paternalistic and scornful of 
those who called ‘class warfare – a barbarous policy of ill-will which had in it the 
possibilities of anarchy and bloodshed.’ 102 Chamberlain was one of the founders of 
the NAEE, which was backed by the Federation of British Industry and involved a 
number of trade union leaders. They, like Baldwin and his supporters, as well as 
Henry Page Croft and Sir Richard Cooper, were deeply suspicious of the 
consequences of war-time state intervention and wished to see a return to pre-war 
industrial relations, albeit on a less antagonistic and more co-operative footing.103 
That the promises of the Coalition candidates were unfulfilled in the post-war was, 
Jon Lawrence argues, largely the fault of the financially orthodox Treasury rather 
than cynical vote-grubbing on the part of the candidates.104 
Of course, some issues persisted which had divided the nation for decades before 
1914, such as tariff reform, temperance, Irish Home Rule, even if they were reframed 
into the new patriotic discourse of 1918.105 On the other hand, certain issues, most 
notably religious identity and the position of the nonconformist faiths, previously so 
significant in the political culture of the region, were almost completely absent from 
the debate during the election. It is possible to conjecture that popular anger towards 
those whose religious conscience prevented them from taking a full part in the war 
effort, drove this issue off the agenda. A survey of the political positions of the 
various Christian denominations in Leamington Spa by the Leamington Spa Courier 
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in late November revealed that the Baptists, the Anglicans and the 
Congregationalists of the town were all in accord in their judgement that the judicious 
punishment of Germany was the priority, in order to avert future conflicts. The 
Catholics of St Peter’s and the Christadelphians may have been more forgiving, but 
they too focused on the need for reconstruction and the sovereignty of a future 
League of Nations, rather than denominational issues.106 Although some evidence 
has been presented to suggest that religion continued to be one of the main 
determinants of voting behaviour in post-war Britain, in the West Midlands there is 
little to suggest that it rivalled occupation or gender as a clear influence.107 
Perhaps the most distinctive survival from the pre-war days was the fetish for 
assessing a candidate’s ‘character’.108 This measure of an individual’s fitness to act 
as a constituency’s MPs involved estimates of the candidate’s personal moral and 
financial probity. It also signified respect for a candidate’s willingness to express his 
views freely, even if these were not shared by a substantial proportion of his 
electorate or his own political party leaders and managers. The Liberal Unionists 
had, in the 1880s, prided themselves on their ‘manly’ independence and resistance 
to the political demagogues and ‘wire-pullers.’109 These issues were especially 
germane, given the issuing of the ‘coupon’, which seemed to suggest to some 
commentators that the chosen candidate would be an instrument of the Coalition 
leadership, unable to act for himself. Neville Chamberlain, as has been noted, 
refused to use the Coalition’s official endorsement in his election campaign. In the 
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parish magazine of St Nicholas church in Warwick, vicar of St Nicholas voiced a 
common concern ‘the coming general election will be perhaps the most important we 
have ever had. The great hope of it is that it will send to Parliament real men, not 
marionettes.’110 Coalition-endorsed candidates did attempt to address this criticism, 
however, such as J. W. Dennis in Deritend who deliberately used the language 
employed by the Liberal rebels against Gladstone’s Home Rule policy thirty years 
earlier to explain his position:   
He did not want to go to Parliament as a delegate….whatever was going to be 
for the good of the country, as a whole, and for the uplifting of the conditions 
of the working classes in particular, he should vote for.111 
As David Craig and James Thompson have recently reminded scholars, ‘languages 
may have a very different salience in alternative contexts, whether regional or 
institutional.’112 It is certainly clear that the more traditional language used by sitting 
Liberal MPs was demonstrably different to that of the Coalition MPs and candidates 
and that the Labour candidates, both ‘official’ Labour and NDLP were employing new 
modes of expression altogether. Patriotism was a common theme used by all, but 
the meaning of the concept varied according to the candidate, the opposition and the 
local identity of areas within the West Midlands, such as the Black Country, the 
western rural shires, Birmingham and its environs. As Simon Skinner has implied, 
patriotic discourse, with its focus on sacrifice, selflessness and moral duty, emerged 
from the war as a replacement for the Victorian nonconformist conscience, with the 
added advantage that all could make use of the concept to support their ideologies, 
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whether these were Liberal demands for social justice, Labour demands for ethical 
socialism or defence of the propertied order and the institutions of the state and 
economy by the Conservatives.113 
It is difficult to reach a decisive conclusion on the effects of the war on political 
culture, given the peculiar nature of the 1918 election. No party had sufficient funds 
to spend on expensive visual election materials which had become the norm since 
1906. The 1918 RPA had not only placed millions more on the electoral roll, a large 
proportion of whom were serving overseas, thus making any canvassing material 
hopelessly out of date, but it had also included a redistribution clause which split up 
constituencies and rendered old loyalties void.114 The election was also taking place 
in the midst of one of the worst medical crises of the 20th century, the influenza 
pandemic, and many candidates were incapacitated for the duration of the 
campaign.115 In these circumstances, voters and candidates complained of an 
unwanted and rushed ‘khaki’ election called just days after the news of the armistice 
by a Prime Minister looking for a vote of confidence in his shaky coalition 
government. Even Austen Chamberlain, a cabinet minister, grumbled about  
a want of workers, absence of organisation. I have never hated [an election] 
so much. The voters are apathetic, the dividing lines of parties obscure and 
uncertain, the issues ill-defined, cranks and numerous worse elements very 
much in evidence.116 
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Despite these circumstances, it is possible to suggest that contemporary complaints 
about the relative apathy of the voters were misplaced, as were more extreme 
reactions, such as that of Sylvia Pankhurst’s Workers’ Dreadnought, which 
proclaimed that the election proved that ‘Parliamentary Government is a failure.’117 
Studies of modern elections with low-turn outs, such as those in recent US history, 
have revealed that voter apathy can be read as an endorsement of the existing 
political system and of the governing party and the personalities of the leaders.118 
Voters with genuine concerns and grievances do not tend to stay at home. The level 
of apathy should not be overstated either, for there was a turn-out of at least 50% in 
three quarters of the thirty nine contested seats in the West Midlands, with at least 
60% of the electorate exercising their vote in thirteen of the contests, which could be 
interpreted as a relatively positive achievement, given the disruption of December 
1918. In the constituencies where the turn-out was especially low, most of which 
were in Birmingham, one might excuse this on the poor quality of the Labour and 
Liberal challengers to the Coalition candidate. On these terms, one can hardly see 
the 1918 results as a ringing endorsement of the Coalition in Birmingham seats such 
as Deritend and Duddeston, where the choice between a Liberal and Couponed 
candidate persuaded less than 40% of the electorate to attend the polling stations on 
14 December.  
As Martin Farr concludes, the First World War marked a beginning rather than an 
end to a pattern and culture of politics.119 Many features of Victorian political culture, 
recently defined by Angus Hawkins, survived the cataclysm: dislike of party 
managers, respect for the consistency, courage and personal integrity of a 
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candidate, preference for local issues over national ones.120 Other changes that the 
war, or rather the 1918 RPA, appeared to stimulate actually had long antecedents in 
pre-war politics, such as the gradual decline of the open meeting, the battle for 
control of a sympathetic press and the growing significance of visual signifiers as 
electoral material. Jon Lawrence stresses the decline in political violence in 1918 
and in the years immediately after, and the local press did emphasis what a 
difference there was during polling and on the day of the declaration, 28 December 
1918.121 The Coventry Herald and Coventry Times reflected that ‘many Coventry 
people remember…when…the polling places were captured by one side or the other 
and held against the enemy, when men were hired to rally the party crowds…when 
the centre of the city was a seething mass of fighting electors.’122 Rather than 
ascribing this to the unique circumstances of the campaign, the article asserted that 
there has been a shift in political culture as a result of the war: 
Modern Coventry has no use for exhibitions of the kind. It attends election 
meetings, listens quietly, asks questions and votes on the way to work or 
when returning home, all without display... the increasingly deeper and wider 
appreciation of the value of business which has seized most people has 
contributed to the welcome change that since the birth of the new century has 
been enlarging and tightening its grasp on the electorate.123  
The change was not entirely anticipated throughout the Midlands, however, for the 
Worcester Herald noted that a shop opposite the Guildhall, where the result was 
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declared, had been barricaded in the expectation of crowd trouble, but that only 200 
people were present for the ‘tamest declaration day ever seen in the city.’124 
The replacement for the mass meeting, the hustings and the use of intimidation was 
the greater use of advertising, reflecting Britain’s increasingly commercialised 
economy. This was also made necessary by the lack of canvassers in autumn 1918 
and the disruption of the electoral roll caused by both war and the RPA. In certain 
local newspapers, candidates battled for voters through their respective 
advertisements. In the Nuneaton Chronicle on 22 November there was a front page 
advert for the Liberal candidate, William Grant, emphasising him as ‘the local 
candidate’ while on the same page Maddocks, the Coalition candidate declared that 
he was ‘the Coalition candidate.’125 It took the Nuneaton Worker’s Union a fortnight 
to place a far smaller sixteen line front page notice announcing their candidate, 
Gregory.126  As can be seen by the expenses returns of Eric Knight, the successful 
Coalition candidate in Kidderminster,  other than the salaries for agents and clerks, 
the largest costs were for ‘printing and stationery’ (£580 0s. 8d), ‘postages, 
telegrams and telephone’ (£96 9s.1d) and advertising, (£75 19s. 4d). Knight only 
spent £15 12s.3d of his total expenses of £1,143 2s.4d on public meetings.127 By 
contrast, Mary Macarthur, the unsuccessful Labour candidate in Stourbridge spent 
£102. 11s.1d on public meetings, but her victorious opponent, John Wilson, spent a 
mere £35 15s, 11d.128 Already in decline before 1914, the political meeting was no 
longer seen as central to a successful electoral campaign by experienced politicians. 
Perhaps the most through use of political advertisement was that printed by the 
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Rugby Advertiser for Baird, the Coalition candidate (fig. 4).Lloyd George’s personal 
endorsement for Baird was printed in a large typeface at the top of the advert, with a 
further endorsement from a Liberal minister below sections expressing Baird’s views 
of social reform, retribution against Germany, trade and soldiers’ and dependents’ 
pensions. At the bottom of the page, clearly with the newly enfranchised voters in 
mind, there was a reproduction of a ballot paper with a clear indication of how to vote 
for ‘Lloyd George’s candidate.’ 
 
Fig. 4. Advertisement for John Baird’s candidature.129 
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Not all elements of the pre-war political material culture disappeared, however. 
Political leaflets remained as important as they had become among a newly literate 
audience in the Edwardian era, perhaps more so given the limited number of posters 
that could be produced in time for the hastily called contest.130 These did begin to 
evolve however, with leaflets designed to be folded and posted through voters’ 
doors, filled with dates of meetings, advice for voters and attractive electoral slogans 
employed by successful candidates such as Manville in Coventry.131 
McKibbin suggests that the new political alliance that won the election may have 
done so by excluding the Labour Party, Trades Unionism and the manual working 
classes in general, but the evidence on both sides of the political spectrum appears 
to challenge this assertion.132 In Birmingham, the victory of Neville Chamberlain’s 
new Association was achieved through a carefully calibrated message that included 
all sections of the community, except those who, through questioning the war effort, 
had set themselves outside the pale. Chamberlain may have collaborated with 
Milner’s BWL, somewhat reluctantly, but Jephcott’s candidacy in Yardley was more 
typical of Chamberlain’s vision for the Unionists to become a truly ‘national party.’133 
Jephcott  was encouraged to emphasise that ‘he was a working man and a trade 
unionist’, going on to add that ‘it was a disgrace to his party that he was the only 
Unionist working man standing in the present election.’ In his opinion, only a 
substantial contingent of working class Unionists would enable them ‘to stand up for 
a progressive policy not of revolution but of evolution and to combat some of the 
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principles urged by the extreme Labour party in the House of Commons.’134  Roger 
Ward concludes that ‘the election of Labour leaders such as Jephcott… was a signal 
that Birmingham Unionism…was socially progressive.’ 135  
Labour historians have drawn attention to the party’s victories in elections in and 
around Staffordshire against couponed opponents, such as Roberts in West 
Bromwich, Davison in Smethwick, Short in Wednesbury, Bromfield in Leek and Sitch 
in Kingswinford. 136 The victories at Kingswinford and Wednesbury were particularly 
notable as the opposition to the couponed unionist candidate was divided between 
Liberal and Labour candidates.137  Perhaps equally significant, however, was the 
size of the vote gained by Labour candidates in the areas which Pelling lumps 
together as ‘agricultural districts.’138 Clare Griffiths has pointed out that ‘most rural 
areas had no Labour organisation before 1918’ and that in particular, ‘the rural 
divisions in the West Midlands…appeared entirely beyond Labour’s reach...most of 
Herefordshire, Worcestershire and Shropshire register as blanks in Labour’s 
electoral record’139 Yet in 1918 Labour won 36% of the vote in Shrewsbury and 40% 
in Oswestry. This was partly due to what Nicholas Mansfield has described as ‘the 
ambivalence to the war on the part of many of the rural poor’ which was expressed 
through ‘passive opposition to conscription, appeals to military tribunals 
and…strikes.’140 Yet Mansfield fails to account for the relative success of the Labour 
candidates in Shrewsbury and Oswestry compared to the performance of Sydney 
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Box in Hereford, who failed to win even a quarter of the votes in a straight fight with 
the former Ross-on-Wye MP, Charles Pulley.  
As transport hubs in otherwise agricultural counties, there was a considerable 
‘railway vote’ and there had been stoppages in Shrewsbury in September 1918 
caused by wage demands in the face of price rises.141  Arthur Taylor in Shrewsbury 
had made sure he had secured the backing of J.H. Thomas and, given the war-time 
presence of women as farm labourers, Taylor also sensibly held discussions with the 
National Union of Women Workers.142 Tom Morris in Oswestry was the vice-
president of the North Wales Miners’ Association and had been adopted as a 
candidate by the Oswestry Trades and Labour Council before the armistice, in 
anticipation of a snap election.143 The National Miners’ Federation put forward nearly 
fifty candidates, all of whom were endorsed by the Labour executive, grateful for the 
fact that they would not have to fund the campaigns from their meagre resources.144 
Morris, admitted to being ‘amazed to find the growth of the Labour movement in the 
Oswestry Division’ and gratified to find that he had the unquestioning support of the 
National Union of Railwaymen, the National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers, 
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers  and the Carpenters’ and Joiners’ Unions.  
Although Morris freely admitted to being ill-suited to the campaign, owing to his 
limited education, the ‘enthusiastic and businesslike manner’ of the call for food 
prices to be maintained to ensure that the farmer could afford both his rent and 
‘adequate wages to agricultural labourers’145 revealed the potential of union co-
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operation and organisation.’146 Morris did admit, after his defeat, that his party had 
not paid the attention to female voters that his couponed opponent had done, and 
that the lack of ‘a single women’s organisation’ had cost them dearly.147 Labour in 
Shropshire also lacked any voice in the local press, with the main weekly 
newspaper, the Shrewsbury Chronicle, owned by the right wing Ludlow MP, Sir 
Beville Stainer, voicing its opinion that the Labour party had no rightful place in local 
politics.148 As the election posters of Will Dyson suggest, however, many voters saw 
the Labour party as a better embodiment of the new community forged by the war 
than that offered by Lloyd George (see fig. 5). 
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Fig. 5. 1918 Labour election poster.149 
  
As Jon Lawrence pointed out in his study of Wolverhampton politics, ‘the ideal of 
progressive co-operation had not been wholly expunged’ by the circumstances of the 
war and there is good evidence that the tradition of the 1903 Gladstone-MacDonald 
agreement did continue in the West Midlands.150  Alfred Hazel stood down in West 
Bromwich, complaining that ‘the Coalition wire-pullers are trying to effect the political 
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assassination of every Liberal member who presumes to think for himself.’ Despite 
his support for Lloyd George’s stated programme of reform, Hazel commented that 
he would ’feel more confident of its being carried out on democratic lines, if vested 
interests were less prominent in the Prime Minister’s following.’ This enabled the 
Labour candidate, Frederick Roberts, who had an impeccable record of service for 
the war effort, a free run against the Coalition Unionist, Viscount Lewisham, and to 
use Liberal rhetoric to appeal to Hazel’s supporters.151 Roberts, who was also vice-
chairman of West Bromwich Albion in an area of impassioned working class football 
allegiance, won with a majority of 1,709, somewhat helped by Lewisham’s  inability 
to campaign due to illness.152 Even the Labour-supporting Birmingham Daily Gazette 
confessed this was ‘one of the great surprises of the day’, but Roberts recognised 
that ‘the fact that the Radicals …declined to split the democratic vote has also been 
a great factor’. His pugnacious refusal to accept the myth of national solidarity, 
pointing out there were few ‘well-to-do’ people in food queues, clearly connected with 
his largely working class audience.153 Duncan Tanner asserts that West Bromwich 
and Smethwick were revelations to the Labour leadership. If Labour could spread its 
‘sharply defined, more independent image [and] repress its radical/pacifist/moralist 
wing’, adopt a practical programme like Roberts’ (he demanded housing with 
bathrooms, a rent act and a minimum wage), it could capture more seats like these 
in future elections.154 In other seats, the Labour party was prepared to allow the 
Liberal a free run against a Unionist opponent if he was sufficiently radical. Despite a 
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large presence by unionised railwaymen in Worcester155, Richard Fairbairn, a 
Liberal, was the sole ‘uncouponed’ candidate put forward in November 1918. 
Fairbairn, a city councillor and manager on the trams, had been made Food 
Transport Officer for the Midlands and had actively participated in Worcester’s 
recruitment drives both before and after the introduction of conscription in January 
1916.156 This positive wartime service, together with his pre-war advocacy of welfare 
reforms, his support for keeping key industries under state control and his public 
statement that he was not ‘a whole-hearted supporter of the Prime Minister’ 
convinced the small local Labour association that he could embody their aspirations 
adequately and they refused to put forward a candidate.157  Despite the formal 
backing of the Worcester Co-operative Society, Fairbairn fell ill from influenza and 
was unable to campaign. Although he failed to achieve more than half the vote of Sir 
Edward Goulding, the Unionist sitting MP, he had made a positive impression and 
went on to win the seat (briefly) in 1922 following Goulding’s ennoblement with the 
backing of now firmly established Worcester Labour party.158 
In Birmingham, Neville and Austen Chamberlain and their Coalition allies benefitted 
from an unusually high proportion of three-cornered contests, compared to the rest 
of the region. In eight of the city’s twelve new seats, the approved candidate faced a 
divided opposition.159 Consequently Birmingham could now comfortably boast that 
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‘we are twelve’.160 The Liberal Party, which had staged a significant resurgence in 
the West Midlands in 1906, was bitterly divided here as elsewhere and the Liberal 
press in the region was unsure who to endorse. Fear of socialism, the impact of 
patriotic discourse and the promise of liberal reconstruction by Lloyd George 
appears to have persuaded many Liberal voters to support the Coalition candidate, 
pushing the Liberal candidate into third place in twelve of the fifteen three-cornered 
elections, except in Stourbridge, where the NDLP split the Labour vote and allowed 
Wilson to retain his seat. He and George Thorne in Wolverhampton East were the 
only Asquith Liberals to retain their seats. With only two coalition Liberals, the party 
was effectively finished in the region and has never significantly recovered in the one 
hundred years since.  
James Thompson has drawn attention towards the significance of the concept of 
‘public opinion’ in Edwardian political discourse and has highlighted how values such 
as ‘earnestness’ and ‘rationality’ were prized by contemporary commentators as true 
expressions of public spirit.161 This definition of certain prized public characteristics 
clearly survived the First World War in the West Midlands. The newly enfranchised 
voters were frequently praised in the press when they failed to respond to the 
promises of socialism or when they rewarded those whose wartime service fitted 
them for public office. Equally, women voters were mocked for their irrational choices 
and lack of public engagement.162 The dominant voices in the press, among 
candidates, the government and other commentators were still those of the middle 
classes and largely conservative (or anti-socialist) ones at that. There was no 
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sudden imperialist passion for tariff reform, there was only limited enthusiasm for the 
idea of a League of Nations and no desire for class-based politics. Instead, almost all 
the coalition candidates sought to bring the new voters into the new consensus, 
promising to bury their previous shibboleths (whether Home Rule, temperance, or 
laissez-faire social policy) and attempting to build a new political culture which was 
less antagonistic and aimed instead at the benefit of the whole community. This was, 
after all, a nation which had shared unparalleled suffering and which was clearly 
fused by a common victory which (almost) all had contributed towards. Egregious 
profiteers and shirking pacifists notwithstanding, the newly enlarged British political 
system was endorsed, if rather unenthusiastically by the electorate in the West 
Midlands in 1918. Victorian liberal culture was alive and well in and around 
Birmingham in 1918, as it was elsewhere in Britain.163 
Ross McKibbin’s conclusion that ‘a coalition of classes and interests’ was created in 
1918 ‘which was united only by a normative hostility towards a political notion of the 
working class’,  may hold true for Birmingham (to an extent), but the seizure of the 
Birmingham Labour movement by extremists was an unusual phenomenon.164 In the 
Black Country and even in such unpromising areas such as Shrewsbury and 
Oswestry and amidst the chaos of Coventry’s five sided election, a significant portion 
of the working classes chose to put their faith in the official Labour party for the first 
time, despite the best efforts of the coalition, the regional and national press, the 
business interests of the region and, inevitably, the Labour party’s own leadership. 
They did so not due to class-hatred and trade unionist fervour, but largely as the 
Liberal party was effectively moribund and Labour was the only true representative 
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of the region’s progressive politics that both Liberals and Liberal Unionists had 
championed before the war.   In the wider West Midlands, British political life was not 
particularly ‘in flux’165; a new politics of class-division and partisan hostility did not 
emerge fully-formed from the war from the war. Rather, three alternative means of 
building a pluralist political response to the war emerged in the region’s three 
distinctive socio-economic areas. In the industrial cities of Birmingham and Coventry, 
a liberal Unionism looked towards collaboration between ‘patriotic’ labour and a 
business elite keen to avoid industrial unrest; in the rural shires, a more paternalistic, 
semi-feudal vision of a mythic England, of healing and reconciliation was 
promulgated by Baldwin and the Conservative Associations; finally in the Black 
Country, the hope for a new Britain where the soldier and the worker would take 
power for himself or herself and create a more equitable society with the benefits of 
the economy shared for all provided the significant breakthrough that Labour needed 
to overhaul the faltering Liberals. Any exceptions to this pattern were largely the 
result of electoral accidents where one vote or another was divided by multiple 
candidates.  Of course, the emergence of alternative political models to that of the 
former Liberal Unionists left the Chamberlain family isolated in Birmingham and far 
less powerful than they had been in the days of ‘good old Joe’ but this was a process 
that had begun in 1906 and was merely accelerated by the political consequences of 
an unprecedented war effort in the heart of England. 
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